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At first glance, two concepts that do not seem related are revolution
and pragmatism. Even a non-violent democratic revolution connotes
ideological passions, as well as the dramatic replacement of one regime
by another. By contrast, pragmatism suggests, in ordinary parlance, a
non-ideological effort aimed at achieving positive results, with no re-
quirement of transformation.' Yet this is a highly incomplete notion of
pragmatism.
This paper will respond to these misconceptions by illustrating how
the U.S. constitutional revolution was dependent on different types of
pragmatism. This is true of some other nations' revolutions as well. The
paper will also identify and map the various types that can be connected
to the U.S. constitutional revolution. The types include common sense,
transitional, political, democratic, economic, empirical, common law,
flexible, critical, and comprehensive pragmatism. With each type of
pragmatism connected to revolution, the paper will show how its legacy
can also be related to certain parts of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence. After all, constitutionalized judicial review ended up being a fun-
damental aspect of the revolutionary break with the British monarchy.
The paper will then discuss two types of constitutional pragmatism
that are not consistent with a revolutionary impulse. These are prudential
and efficiency-oriented pragmatism. The paper will fill an important gap
t James Madison Chair Professor in Constitutional Law, Director of the Drake Constitu-
tional Law Center. I would like to thank Richard Albert, Ian Bartrum, John Edwards, Theresa How-
ard, Miguel Schor, Mike Seidman, Lee Strang, Renner Walker, Karen Wallace, Robin West, Kathy
Zeiler, and Stephen Sheppard for their assistance. This paper also benefited from discussions that
took place at the Georgetown University Law Center Faculty Workshop and at the Loyola Chicago
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1. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines pragmatism as "a practical approach to problems
and affairs." It gives the example of a policy that "tried to strike a balance between principles and
pragmatism." Pragmatism, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pragmatism (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). Thus, pragmatism is contrasted,
wrongly or rightly, with the kind of fundamental principles that are at the base of ideological pas-
sions. Interestingly, the philosopher Immanuel Kant was one of the first to use a similar term, in a
somewhat different way, and yet he is celebrated as an idealist moral philosopher. LOUIs MENAND,
THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 227 (2001). The term also has Greek roots given Aristotle's discussion of
practical wisdom and ethics. Richard Kraut, Aristotle's Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 6 (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/.
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in the scholarly literature as constitutional pragmatism has been under-
theorized and criticized, without an awareness of this typology.
At its most general level, constitutional pragmatism means that the
Supreme Court should be less formalistic, and should candidly
acknowledge that the traditional modalities of constitutional interpreta-
tion do not answer the hardest constitutional questions. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience."2 Consequences are key, though I will show that moral
principles can also matter. Among the few prominent scholars who sup-
port a pragmatic approach are Richard Posner3 and Daniel Farber.4 Yet
pragmatism does a better job of describing how the influential, and at
times revolutionary, U.S. Supreme Court decides cases than either
originalism or living constitutionalism-two of the more popular theo-
nes.
That's why Mark Tushnet has characterized U.S. constitutional in-
terpretation in terms of eclectic pragmatism,5 and Brian Tamanaha has
6
argued that more judges are pragmatists than any other category. Indeed,
Justice Kagan said she would be a pragmatic judge, at her confirmation
hearings, and Justice Alito gave that impression as well.7 In addition,
Justice Breyer has authored a book advocating the workable Constitu-
tion.8 Justice Sotomayor has taken a pragmatic approach in her cases, and
Justice Scalia's "soft originalism" acknowledges that stare decisis is im-
portant for pragmatic reasons. Moreover, the Justices must write coali-
tion opinions that often cannot reflect foundational views. Also, lawyers
and judges are pragmatists who rely on as many tools as possible in argu-
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (2009).
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2003).
4. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331,
1332-33 (1988) (arguing that legal pragmatism constitutes an adequate foundation for constitutional
law).
5. Mark Tushnet, The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STuDY 7 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
6. Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 490 (2007); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230 n.2
(2008).
7. The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 82, 122, 177, 178, 270
(2010) (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General of the United States), ("I would look at this very
practically and very pragmatically, that sometimes some approach-one approach is the relevant one
and will give you the best answer on the law, and sometimes another."); Edward Lazarus, What Kind
of Justice Will Samuel Alito Be? A Recent Death Penalty Decision Provides Some Insights,
FINDLAW (May 11, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/2006051I.html ("But Alito's opin-
ion declaring South Carolina's rule unconstitutional did not fulfill any of these fears. Instead, it
reflects much of the persona Alito ascribed to himself at his hearings-namely, that he was a plain-
spoken, pragmatic, and precedent-oriented judge.").




mg for, or reaching, a result.9 And many of the framers were legally
trained.
This typology is part of a larger project on pragmatism in constitu-
tional thought. The paper is mainly descriptive and somewhat explorato-
ry. Hopefully, the project can help scholars, judges, and others discuss
constitutional pragmatism more intelligently, as well as see its complexi-
ty and ubiquity. Indeed, there is much room for additional work. Political
scientists, for example, could use this typology to code Supreme Court
cases, and examine in more detail how pragmatism has been employed.
A caveat is necessary. This paper will not explore philosophical
pragmatism in depth (e.g., the distinctions among Charles Pierce, Wil-
liam James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty). That's already been done
by numerous scholars. Indeed, Thomas Grey has made clear that a legal
pragmatist need not be a philosophical one.'o At the same time, there are
connections. Louis Menand and others have examined the close philo-
sophical ties between Holmes and James." Holmes's values skepticism
is connected to the legal realist school, which has roots in pragmatist
philosophy.12 Similarly, John Dewey's more optimistic and "experi-
mental" pragmatism has influenced legal theorists.13 The paper will,
however, examine the strengths and weaknesses of the differing types of
constitutional pragmatism, especially from a revolutionary context. The
paper comes at an interesting time as President Obama has been de-
scribed as a constitutional pragmatist.14
II. TYPOLOGY
A. Common-Sense Pragmatism
In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that Americans rejected the
European aristocracy in favor of an egalitarian view rooted in the Puri-
tans." Everyone should have the chance to prosper given the right work
9. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law & the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 184 (2006) ("Lawyers are rhetorical opportunists and pragmatists: They
are always looking for new ways to impress and persuade their audiences, and to bestow authority
and legitimacy on themselves and on the institutions and practices they seek to defend.").
10. See Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM
254 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
11. See MENAND, supra note 1, at 217.
12. Id. at 438.
13. See id. at 360; see also Susan Schulten, Barack Obama, Abraham Lincoln, and John
Dewey, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 815 (2009); Dorothy Evensen et al., Where Have You Gone John
Dewey?: Locating the Challenge to Continue and the Challenge to Grow as a Profession, 108 PENN
ST. L. REV. 19, 26 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Christopher Hayes, The Pragmatist, THE NATION (Dec. 29, 2008),
http://www.thenation.com/article/pragmatist; see also Alexandra Starr, Students Saw in Professor
Obama a Pragmatist, Not an Ideologue, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/world/americas/I9iht-
pragmatist. 1.1 6306854.html?pagewanted=all.
15. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 32-35 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1835 & 1840).
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ethic, individual character, etc. 16 This ethos was partly responsible for
America's burgeoning middle class. He also suggested that Americans
disliked pretense, intellectual or otherwise.17 De Tocqueville was de-
scribing the common-sense temperament of many Americans. This prac-
tical sensibility was actually fundamental to the colonist's decision to
revolt and is also central to present American attitudes. Moreover, this
sensibility has found its way into the Supreme Court's opinions.
1. Revolution
Thomas Paine's popular 1776 pamphlet "Common Sense" helped
light the revolutionary fuse.18 It argued for separation from Britain in a
persuasive, clever, and yet accessible manner that resonated with the
educated class. Paine said, "I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain
arguments, and common sense."l 9 Interestingly, Paine was a common-
er.20
The pamphlet was pragmatic in other ways. It was propaganda de-
signed to gain support from the French, as well as the American citizen-
ry.21 The pamphlet even specified how a new government should be or-
ganized.
This excerpt from the Introduction shows Paine's rhetorical skills:
The cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all man-
kind. Many circumstances have, and will arise, which are not local,
but universal, and through which the principles of all lovers of man-
kind are affected, and in the event of which, their affections are inter-
ested. The laying a country desolate with fire and sword, declaring
war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the de-
fenders thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every
man as to whom nature hath given the power of feeling; of which
class, regardless of party censure, is THE AUTHOR.22
16. De Tocqueville noted:
[I]n America the aristocratic element, always weak since birth, is, if not destroyed, at
least weakened, so that it is difficult to assign it any influence whatsoever in the course of
affairs. Time, events, and the laws have, on the contrary, rendered the democratic element
not only preponderant there, but so to speak unique. No influence of family or corpora-
tion is allowed to be perceived; often one cannot even discover any individual influence
however long lasting. America therefore presents the strangest phenomenon in its social
state. Men show themselves to more equal in their fortunes and in their intelligence or, in
other terms, more equally strong than they are in any country in the world and than they
have been in any century of which history keeps a memory.
Id. at 51-52.
17. Id. at 540-41.
18. See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), available at
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamericalmilestones/ commonsense/text.html.
19. Id.
20. HARVEY J. KAYE, THOMAS PAINE AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 18 (2005).
21. See PAINE, supra note 18.
22. Id.
638 [Vol. 89:3
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The pamphlet criticized the British king's detachment:
There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of
monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet
empowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is required.
The state of a king shuts him from the world, yet the business of a
king requires him to know it thoroughly, wherefore the different
parts, unnaturally opposing and destroying each other, prove the
whole character to be absurd and useless. 23
Moreover, he wrote, in a scientific vein:
. . . [T]here is something very absurd, in supposing a continent to be
perpetually governed by an island. In no instance hath nature made
the satellite larger than its primary planet, and as England and Amer-
ica, with respect to each Other, reverses the common order of nature,
it is evident they belong to different systems: England to Europe-
America to itself.24
He adds that "[c]ommon sense will tell us, that the power which hath
endeavored to subdue us, is of all others the most improper to defend
us." 25 Paine is saying the monarchy's injustice is obvious. The Declara-
tion of Independence echoes this sentiment when it says, "We hold these
truths to be self-evident." 2 6
Paine invoked the Bible frequently. "That the Almighty hath ... en-
tered his protest against monarchial government is true, or the scripture is
false."27 In the appendix, Paine wrote that "we have every opportunity
and every encouragement before us, to form the noblest, purest constitu-
tion on the face of the earth. We have it in our power to begin the world
again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the
days of Noah until now." 28 These Bible references would have resonated
with his audience.
He discussed constitutional principles as well:
I take the liberty of rementioning the subject, by observing, that a
charter is to be understood as a bond of solemn obligation, which the
whole enters into, to support the right of every separate part, whether
of religion, personal freedom, or property. A firm bargain and a right




26. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
27. PAINE, supra note 18.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Robin West has written eloquently, however, that Paine was not en-
dorsing constitutional judicial review here. 30 Harvey Kaye has said that
Paine was the revolution's only real voice of radical democracy.
As Sophia Rosenfeld has shown in her intellectual history of com-
mon sense, Paine drew heavily from the Scottish Enlightenment philoso-
phers who subsequently influenced drafters of the U.S. Constitution like
Madison.3 2 Moreover, Philadelphia delegate James Wilson was Scot-
tish.33 These philosophers were empirically minded and critical, yet hu-
mane, optimistic, and rights-oriented.
2. Cases
U.S. Supreme Court Justices have frequently relied on common-
sense arguments. Justice Potter Stewart said of obscenity, "I know it
when I see it." 34 The Court later ruled that a jury must determine what is
obscene using the "community standard."3 5 Justice Scalia often criticizes
the views of the elites as against the wisdom of ordinary people. 6 More
recently, the Justices are relying on ordinary dictionaries in defining the
words of a statute, rather than trying to assess what the congressional
drafters intended or to use specialized legal references.3 7 Several critics
have argued this could lead to "dictionary shopping."3 8 And U.S. private
law consistently employs the "reasonable person" standard.
The U.S. Supreme Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina39 recently is-
sued a 5-4 decision in which the majority relied on common sense. The
Court ruled that the police had failed to provide the Miranda warning to
a thirteen-year-old who had been removed from his classroom and ques-
tioned in a conference room for thirty minutes. 4 0 He confessed to com-
mitting some thefts.4 ' The government argued there was no "custody" so
30. See Robin West, Tom Paine's Constitution, 89 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2003) ("Pleasing
and even natural though such an interpretation may be, however, my first contention in this Article
will be simply that it is an untenable reading of Tom Paine's philosophy. Neither Paine nor his
famous utterance can be drafted fairly to the cause of judicial review or, more generally, to court-
centered constitutionalism.").
31. KAYE, supra note 20; see also Joseph J. Ellis, 'Thomas Paine and the Promise ofAmeri-
ca': Founding Father of the American Left, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/books/review/3 I ELLISL.html?pagewanted=all.
32. SOPHIA ROSENFELD, COMMON SENSE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 176 (2011).
33. Id.
34. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230
(1972)).
36. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Court takes
sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more specifical-
ly with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's
Members are drawn.")
37. See Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not for Big
Words, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at All.
38. See, e.g., id.
39. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
40. Id. at 2399, 2403, 2418; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-70 (1966).
41. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399-400.
640 [Vol. 89:3
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Mirandizing was not needed.42 Justice Sotomayor said that the child's
age had to be taken into account in making the custody determination.43
She used the word "commonsense" five times to justify her ruling,
though she also relied on other legal arguments."
She began by writing:
This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected
to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda.
It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to
police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would
feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to
blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's
age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis.45
The Sotomayor opinion, however, also relies on empirical studies,
the American legal tradition of treating youth differently, other cases,
46and constitutional values. Justice Sotomayor nonetheless concludes:
In short, officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge
of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or exper-
tise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child's age.
They simply need the commonsense to know that a 7-year-old is not
a 13-year-old and neither is an adult.47
Justice Alito dissented. He explained that Miranda actually over-
turned the Court's previous fact-specific, case-by-case approach. Thus,
Sotomayor was reopening the slippery slope:
Under today's new "reality"-based approach to the doctrine, perhaps
these and other principles of our Miranda jurisprudence will, like the
custody standard, now be ripe for modification. Then, bit by bit, Mi-
randa will lose the clarity and ease of application that has long been
viewed as one of its chief justifications.48
Alito is therefore using a different pragmatic objection to be dis-
cussed later in this paper-efficiency.
42. Id. at 2402-04
43. Id. at 2399.
44. Id. at 2399, 2403.
45. Id. at 2398-99 (citation omitted). Interestingly, other Justices have used two words,
"common sense," CSX Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.), contra-
ry to Justice Sotomayor who views this phrase as only one word. This shows the difficulty of reach-
ing agreement on basic matters.
46. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400-08.
47. Id. at 2407.
48. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Andrew Coan has authored a commentary
that is consistent with Justice Alito's characterization of Justice Sotomayor's approach. Andrew B.





For example, the ruling could mean that police officers and courts
will have to determine a suspect's intelligence and other personal quali-
ties, in assessing the need for Mirandizing. Common sense will not help
because
the judge will be required to determine whether the differences be-
tween a typical 16 V2-year-old and a typical 18-year-old with respect
to susceptibility of the pressures of interrogation are sufficient to
change the outcome of the custody determination. Today's opinion
contains not a word of actual guidance as to how judges are supposed
to go about making that determination.49
Justice Sotomayor, however, has the better argument. Judges and
police officers determine an individual's mental capacity in many cir-
cumstances. Moreover, police officers can ensure clarity by using the
Miranda warning when there is doubt.
Common sense can also support conservative results. In Gonzales v.
Carhart,50 Justice Kennedy upheld a federal law banning partial birth
abortions by stating:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.
... It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she did not
know; that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the
fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the hu-
man form.51
For the four dissenters, Justice Ginsburg responds that "the Court
invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no relia-
ble evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices,
and consequently suffer from 'severe depression and loss of self-
esteem."' 52 This debate shows that one person's common sense can be
another person's gender stereotype.
As seen, common sense can be a powerful tool. Yet it can be sub-
jective in a way that differs from scientific evidence. For example, while
progressives celebrate Thomas Paine's commitment to radical democra-
cy, Glenn Beck claims Paine's legacy in a book called Glenn Beck's
49. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting).
50. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
51. Id. at 159-60.
52. Id. at 183.
642 [Vol. 89:3
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Common Sense,53 as does the Tea Party.54 Sophia Rosenfeld has said the
concept can be invoked to promote useful or dangerous forms of popu-
lism and anti-elitism."5 Nonetheless, the idea is seeing a resurgence.
B. Transitional Pragmatism
One aspect of many democratic constitutional revolutions is transi-
tional pragmatism. The term refers to government or court actions that
approach rule of law boundaries, usually because of exigent circum-
stances or regime discontinuities. 5 7 The U.S. is a good example, but there
are foreign situations as well. Even a few U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have a transitional quality.58 An analogy can be drawn to the idea of tran-
sitional justice.
1. Revolution
Several major events in American constitutional history pushed the
legal envelope. These include approval of the Constitution, the Louisiana
Purchase, the Emancipation Proclamation, approval of the Civil War
Amendments, the New Deal, certain American military actions, and
more.
a. The Constitution
Some scholars have argued that the framers of the U.S. Constitution
exceeded their authority.5 9 They were supposed to solve the nation's
commerce problems, not create a new charter. Yet this was not their sole
excess. The U.S. Constitution only had to be ratified by nine states,
which contradicted the Articles of Confederation requirement that consti-
53. GLENN BECK & JOSEPH KERRY, GLENN BECK'S COMMON SENSE: THE CASE AGAINST AN
OUT-OF-CONTROL GOVERNMENT, INSPIRED BY THOMAS PAINE 11 (2009).
54. See, e.g., COMMON SENSE CAMPAIGN-TEA PARTY 2011,
http://www.commonsensecampaign.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (demonstrating a Tea Party
group's use of common sense as a campaign theme).
55. ROSENFELD, supra note 32, at 228.
56. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO
THE RIGHT THING 114, 122 (2010) (discussing the necessity of wisdom in decision making as op-
posed to non-discretionary rule following); PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:
How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 22-31 (1994) (arguing that in search of certainty, law has
moved from common sense decision making to strict adherence to statute); Mark Modak-Truran, A
Pragmatic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55, 58-60 (2001) (arguing that
the "hunch theory" of judicial decision making presents a practical solution to the explosion of fact
and indeterminacy of the law). Truran and Howard are discussing different issues and probably have
distinct views on judicial discretion; however, both invoke common sense. But see DUNCAN J.
WATFS, EVERYTHING IS OBVIOUS: ONCE You KNow THE ANSWER 7-11 (2011) (arguing that com-
mon sense is not easy to decipher and recognize).
57. Another possibility was to use the term illegality, rather than transitional, but that doesn't
seem to fit. These exigent circumstances mean the legal regime is either in flux or under such tre-
mendous pressure that a clear notion of legality is infeasible.
58. See infra notes 83-88.
59. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 475, 476-486 (1995) (discussing the Federalists' role in creating a strong central government
at the expense of individual state sovereignty).
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tutional amendments be unanimous.o Moreover, the Articles required
61
that amendments be ratified by state legislatures, not state conventions.
Bruce Ackerman describes the framing as a constitutional moment be-
cause of the extraordinary transition that was occurring. 62
Many foreign constitutions have similar histories. Regarding eight-
eenth century France, Jon Elster explained:
... Constitution-makers do not always respect the instructions from
their upstream creators, including instructions about downstream rati-
fication. And a constraint that can be ignored is no constraint. ... In
France, the constituent assembly decided to ignore the instructions of
their constituencies with regard to both the voting procedures and the
King's veto.63
Moving to the twentieth century, Hungary drafted a new Constitution
that had to be approved by the former communist Parliament. As Istvan
Pogany said:
It remains a singular irony of this entire process of constitutional re-
form that the bulk of the law providing for the democratization of the
political process in Hungary, for the recognition of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, for the establishment of a Constitutional
Court ... should have been adopted by a legislature which in 1989
had not been democratically elected.6
Similarly, in South Africa, the transition to democracy began when
the apartheid government's racially divided, tri-cameral parliament ap-
proved an interim constitution that was drafted by unelected elites in
60. Id; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 32-60 (1998). Akhil
Amar strongly disagrees. Akhil Amar, America's Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional
Interpretation, 115 YALE L. J. 1997, 2012 (2006) ("In my view, the Articles of Confederation were a
mere treaty whose repeated violations by virtually all states legally justified exit from the Articles if
a supermajority of states so agreed, as provided by the Constitution's Article VI."). But see Michael
Green, Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal Order, 83 N.C. L. REV.
331, 344-45 (2005) (critiquing Amar's view). Green also says of the founding that
there are three possible revolutions at issue here, each of which Amar denies occurred:
(1) a revolutionary creation of one American legal system out of the state legal systems at
the time of the Articles of Confederation; (2) a revolutionary recreation of the state legal
systems through the dissolution of the Articles; and (3) a revolutionary creation (or recre-
ation) of the American legal system out of the state systems with the ratification of the
Constitution.
Id. at 348. Green therefore also is saying that Ackerman's view of one constitutional moment at the
founding is not complete. See id.
61. Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 59, at 478-79.
62. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 160.
63. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution Making Process, 45 DUKE L. J.
364, 374-75 (1995).
64. VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 279 (2d ed.
2008). See also id. at 287 (quoting Arato regarding the "temporary lawlessness" that existed in
Eastern European transitions). Hungary is experiencing constitutional difficulties now as the gov-
ernment seeks to restrict rights and the power of judicial review. See, e.g., Judy Dempsey, Hungari-




collaboration with old regime representatives. 65 This interim charter
paved the way for an elected coalition executive, and a separate, elected
parliament. This new parliament was then charged with drafting the final
constitution. Yet the racist, illegitimate nature of the tri-cameral parlia-
ment cannot be doubted.66 Moreover, the final constitution had to meet
certain criteria created by apartheid officials and other group elites.67
b. Other events
In 1800, the U.S. made the Louisiana Purchase from France and
opened a huge Western frontier. Ironically, the strict constitutional con-
structionist, President Thomas Jefferson, signed the treaty despite writing
to John Breckenridge, "The constitution has made no provision for our
holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into
our Union. The Executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so
much advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the
Constitution." 68 Moreover, the Constitution did not explicitly authorize
this kind of land acquisition by treaty. And the Constitution did not allow
69the President to create new states.
In addition, the U.S. knew that Napoleon had already signed a treaty
with Spain agreeing not to cede the land to another nation. 70 But practical
interests won out. It's worth noting that there are powerful arguments in
favor of the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, but Jefferson's
willingness to go forward was certainly not based on them.
During the Civil War, there were many questionable actions. Presi-
dent Lincoln suspended habeas corpus without congressional authority.7 1
Through the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln freed the slaves in the
rebellious states by executive order, yet the Constitution only seemed to
allow the states to do that.7 2 Of course, Lincoln invoked his Commander-
65. MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN Two WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
UNITED STATES 28 (2009).
66. See generally In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
(4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.) (regarding the South African transition). Strong legal positivists, however,
might disagree that there were legality gaps in any of these nations.
67. KENDE, supra note 65, at 34.
68. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President, United States of America, to John C. Brecken-
ridge (Aug. 12, 1803), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document-
1915.
69. See generally Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States'
Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343 (2002) (asserting the illegality of the
Louisiana Purchase).
70. Id. at 380.
71. Ex parte Merryman, 17. F. Cas. 144, 148-49 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (questioning
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ); see generally Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, The Consti-
tution of Necessity, and the Necessity of Constitutions: A Reply to Professor Paulsen, 59 ME. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (describing how President Lincoln relied on the necessity doctrine to suspend habeas
corpus without congressional authority).
72. Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proc-




in-Chief authority since he had strategic motivations to acquire addition-
al soldiers, and to create instability in the Southern states, etc. As U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson later said, the Constitution is not a
"suicide pact." But Lincoln came close to rewriting the Constitution.
Bruce Ackerman and others have concluded the Civil War Amend-
ments were enacted improperly.7 3 The Military Reconstruction Act op-
pressed the South, though for understandable reasons. As Ackerman
shows, some Southern whites were disenfranchised, and the typical state
deliberative role in the amendment process was curtailed by presidential
pressure.74 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed ready to declare Re-
construction unconstitutional, but Congress removed the Court's jurisdic-
tion as described in Ex parte McCardle.75 Of course, supporters argued
that the Reconstruction Act and the Civil War Amendments fulfilled the
promise of the U.S. Revolution. Even Ackerman says they were a higher
form of lawmaking.76 But they were also designed strategically to denude
the South of certain powers.77
Ackerman has also argued that the "switch in time," where the Su-
preme Court suddenly started approving the constitutionality of FDR's
New Deal programs, was a constitutional moment.7 8 These rulings per-
mitted transition to a new administrative state. Lastly, several American
military forays, that affected the international balance of power, were
executed without any congressional deilaration of war or the equivalent,
which was quite convenient for the President.79
2. Cases
Several Supreme Court decisions have transitional pragmatic ele-
ments, rather than following customary legal conventions.
The Court did not use accepted legal reasoning in Bush v. Gore8o
because it announced the decision had no precedential value.8' That does
not fit with the rule of law, even given the exigent circumstances. More-
73. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 99-119; see also Douglas Bryant, Unorthodox and Para-
dox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2002)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was not constitutionally enacted and may not be a part of
the Constitution).
74. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at I10, 164.
75. 74 U.S. 506, 512-14 (1869).
76. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 172.
77. See Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1764 (2005) (referencing the
pragmatic qualities of amendments to the Constitution).
78. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 314-15.
79. See Bruce Ackerman, Obama's Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicycom/articles/2011/03/24/obama s unconstitutional war?page=0,0 (dis-
cussing instances where the President engaged in war-like activity without the consent of Congress).
80. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes presents many complexities.").
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over, the case was a transitional moment in American presidential re-
gimes, with some even calling it a coup d'dtat.82
One of the Supreme Court's most bizarrely reasoned cases was
Bolling v. Sharpe, which ignored the absence of an equality provision
in the Fifth Amendment, and adopted the confusing doctrine of reverse
incorporation.84 The Court, however, was being pragmatic, as it could
not allow the federal government to support racial segregation after de-
ciding Brown. The decision was therefore part of a changing social dy-
namic. Of course, transitional pragmatism is not a recommended consti-
tutional interpretive method. It's more like the last available alternative.
There are many critics of the Court who attack other decisions as
lawless. Thus, conservatives say Roe v. Wade85 has no legal basis. More-
over, Justice Scalia has frequently criticized his liberal colleagues as
acting out their personal preferences in cases involving gay rights.8 6 And
many liberals have decried Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion87 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1.88 Yet these cases do not involve transitional settings, and the
presence of detailed legal reasoning in the decisions means they do not
approach lawlessness. For all their imperfections, these cases are far
more persuasive than Bolling.
C. Compromise Pragmatism
Scholars have long debated whether controversial Supreme Court
decisions are really politics dressed up in legal terminology. Certainly
the framers were politicians of the first order. And the Court does follow
the election returns. 89 Moreover, according to Otto van Bismark, "poli-
tics is the art of the possible." 90 Thus, it's important to examine the role
of compromise pragmatism, and especially compromise, in our constitu-
tional democracy.
82. Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore,
82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 634 (2002) ("One often hears the sardonic remark that George W. Bush 'won'
his election five to four. But even a unanimous court could not have conferred legitimacy on a judi-
cial coup d'6tat, achieved by stopping and displacing an election.").
83. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
84. Id. at 498-99.
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to terminate a pregnancy is protected by a
privacy interest inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
86. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. 131 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down campaign finance laws as restrictions against
speech).
88. 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down voluntary school desegregation plans).
89. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901) ("No matter whether the
country follows the flag or not, the Supreme Court follows the election returns.").
90. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 86 (Fred R. Shaprio ed., 2006). By contrast, Groucho
Marx said, "Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly,
and applying the wrong remedies." Groucho Marx Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/g/groucho-marx_3.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
6472012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
1. Revolution
Pepperdine Law Review devoted a 2011 volume to compromise and
constitutionalism. Compromise is clearly crucial in constitutional de-
sign.9' In Philadelphia, the larger states allowed the smaller states equal
representation in the U.S. Senate.92 Moreover, constitutional ratification
turned on drafting a Bill of Rights that Madison did not think was a good
idea or necessary. But he made the concession.9 3 Similarly, in South Af-
rica, the African National Congress revolutionaries did not want a Bill of
Rights for years, but they compromised in the end.94 Compromise also
has a downside as shown by the inclusion of slavery in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Yet the democratic constitutional revolutions in the U.S. and South
Africa could not have taken place without such compromises.
Two more examples from South Africa show this. The first was the
inclusion of the controversial Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
the constitution. This conciliatory approach endorsed the communal
resolution of bitter disputes, not international criminal prosecutions and
revenge. 95 South Africa also left the old legal framework in place despite
the system's connection to oppression, and the presence of many Afri-
kaner office holders. The ANC, however, believed that the alternative
would be politically destabilizing and could undermine their reformist
and rebuilding goals.97
Similarly, on the reconciliation topic, many commentators on the
U.S. actions, after overthrowing Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, argued
that the Coalition Provisional Authority should not have ousted all of
Hussein's Baathist party members from their positions, as technically
qualified replacements were lacking. 9 8 This political decision hindered
the transition to democracy and created lingering animosities.
2. Cases
Many U.S. Supreme Court decisions reveal politically pragmatic re-
sults, sometimes because of political pressures. The U.S. Supreme
Court's "switch in time" on FDR's New Deal legislation was perhaps the
91. See Sandy Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821, 823
(2011).
92. Id. at 828. This is often referred to as the "Great Compromise." See CAROL BERKIN, A
BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 114 (2002).
93. Levinson, supra note 91, at 823.
94. KENDE, supra note 65, at 29.
95. See RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 132-33 (2001).
96. See JENS MEIRERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG RUN CONSEQUENCES OF
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652-2000, at 288-89 (2008).
97. See id at 276-77.
98. See, e.g., Arthur MacMillan, Legacy of US "Mistakes" in Iraq Palpable, THE TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 1, 2010, 11:54 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/7127472/Legacy-of-US-
mistakes-in-Iraq-palpable.html. Admittedly, this was not a simple democratic revolution because the
U.S. invaded Iraq, but the lesson is the same.
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most famous example.99 In Marbury v. Madison,00 Chief Justice Mar-
shall ruled for his political opponent, President Thomas Jefferson, who
refused to allow delivery of a signed and sealed judicial commission to
Mr. Marbury.'or However, the ruling established the power of constitu-
tional review.102 Jefferson won the battle, but Marshall won the war. The
decision was also politically pragmatic in that Marshall faced impeach-
ment had he ruled against Jefferson.10 3
The Dred Scott v. Sanford'0 case appears to have been Justice
Taney's political attempt to resolve the nation's slavery dilemma by his
obiter dictum that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the federal terri-
tories, that slaves could not sue in federal courts, and that slave owners
had due process rights because slaves were chattel.'0o This solution,
however, failed, landing Dred Scott in the pantheon of the U.S.-
constitutional-law anti-canon-like the Lochner decision.'o0
Chief Justice Warren obtained a unanimous vote in Brown by agree-
ing not to state that education was a fundamental constitutional right.107
Then, in Brown 11,108 the Court only required district courts to implement
the remedy "with all deliberate speed."'09 This was an overly cautious
compromise based on fears of violent backlash and fears that the public
would reject the Court's authority. Brown I actually allowed Southern
states to remain more intransigent.
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,"o Justice Pow-
ell walked a tightrope."' He wrote that affirmative action should get
strict scrutiny, but that a carefully crafted diversity based plan could be
99. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 154 (1995). But see BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEw DEAL: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 4
(1998) (rejecting the politically motivated "switch in time" view of the Court's change in voting
patterns on FDR's social welfare legislation).
100. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
101. Id at 162.
102. Id. at 177.
103. See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 207 (1997).
104. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
105. Id. at 411, 427, 451-52.
106. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 85 (2005). But see DAVID BERNSTEIN,
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM I
(2011) (drawing similarities between Dred Scott and Lochner).
107. See James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education Is Not Enough, 34
AKRON L. REV. 383, 387 (2000) (discussing the constitutional protections implicitly afforded to
education).
108. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
109. Id. at 301.
110. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111. Seeid.at291,316.
6492012]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
constitutional.' 12 This approach was later vindicated in Grutter v. Bol-
linger.'13
Interestingly, none of the three Justices who authored the plurality
in Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Caseyll4 may have personally supported
the abortion right.' 15 Yet, they tried to craft a grand compromise that
vindicated the right, while granting the states more license to discourage
abortions. Casey also openly discussed the political danger to its institu-
tional integrity of reversing Roe.11 6 Casey, though, has not dampened
emotions.
In Lawrence v. Texas,'"7 the Court affirmed the right of homosexu-
als to have sex in private." 8 Yet the Court never adopted a level of scru-
tiny. This omission was almost certainly needed to retain the required
votes. That compromise reflects what Cass Sunstein calls an incomplete-
ly theorized agreement."'9 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius is another ex-
ample as he said the tax argument supported the health mandate, but the
Commerce Clause did not.12 0 He also upheld the mandate but struck
down the Medicaid requirement.121
Another notion of compromise pragmatism has recently come to the
fore. Several constitutional scholars have argued the U.S. Supreme
Court's most revolutionary decisions actually followed public opinion.
Michael Klarman argued that public opinion had already turned in favor
of Brown by 1954.122 Barry Friedman has questioned the existence of any
countermajoritarian dilemma.123 Jeffrey Rosen has a similar thesis.124
112. Id.
113. 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). The 5-4 decision in Grutter upheld the affirmative action plan.
However, Justice O'Connor, who authored the opinion, has since been replaced by Justice Alito.
Justice Alito, generally opposes affirmative action plans. Moreover, there is a case modeled on
Grutter that has reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213
(5th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012). This means the Supreme Court could overturn
Bakke and Grutter soon. Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2011, at SR4 (debating the constitutionality of the University of Texas School of Law's affirmative
action plan).
114. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115. See id. at 850 (1992) ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision."). There is language in the plurality
opinion that indicates ambivalence.
116. Id. at 845-46.
117. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
118. Id at 585.
119. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36
(1995).
120. 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2600-01 (2012).
121. Id. at 2608.
122. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344-46 (2004).
123. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 375 (2009).




Some have explained this trend by indicating the Court seeks to avert
backlash. Orly Lobel has asserted that constitutional litigation itself is a
compromise since elites comply with the legal system's rules, with the
goal of minimizing grass roots activism. 12 5
Richard Pildes and Justin Driver have challenged this public opin-
ion thesis, arguing that there is no adequate proof that the public support-
ed Brown.'2 6 Certainly extreme Southern and Northern (Boston) reac-
tions showed opposition. Such decisions were therefore revolutionary
and acted as social movement catalysts, even if they still needed support
from the politicians and federal troops.
Political or compromise pragmatism seems troubling as a method of
constitutional interpretation in that we want the Court to decide cases
based on legal criteria. Yet there is nothing fundamentally inconsistent
between the rule of law and the idea that the Court must be sensitive to
real world implications. Moreover, such compromise is often essential
for democratic revolutions.
D. Democratic Pragmatism
Justice Breyer's judicial opinions promote participation in the polit-
ical process. Appropriately, his first book as a Supreme Court Justice
was called Active Liberty. The book responded in part to Justice Scalia's
book on originalism.127 Breyer's method has roots in Benjamin Constant,
and in John Dewey's pragmatism.
1. Revolution
The American constitutional revolution was about popular sover-
eignty. But political and other considerations precluded implementation
of pure democracy. Thus, the framers adopted a Republican deliberative
form of government. The Federalist Papers, for example, contain lengthy
discussions on how pure democracy would risk the dangers of faction,
etc.12 8 Further, Benjamin Constant wrote that the framers sought liberty
beyond negative freedom from government interference.12 9 The framers
sought "an active and constant participation in collective power" or ac-
tive liberty. 30
125. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 949-56 (2007).
126. Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 121-23 (2010); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 758
(2011).
127. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, at
vii (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
129. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty ofthe Ancients Compared with That ofthe Moderns, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 327 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans.,1988).
130. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 5 (2005). Several other scholars have promoted
political deliberation as important and as being justified by the republican roots of the U.S. Constitu-
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The pragmatist philosopher and educator, John Dewey, sought to
promote civic engagement:
The trouble ... is that we have taken democracy for granted; we have
thought and acted as if our forefathers had founded it once and for
all. We have forgotten that it has to be enacted anew in every genera-
tion, in every year, in every day, in the living relations of person to
person, in all social forms and institutions. Forgetting this ... we
have been negligent in creating a school that should be the constant
nurse of democracy.
13'
Dewey did not believe there was an absolute truth that answered
life's grandest questions. He had an optimistic vision, however, that con-
trasted with Holmes's pragmatism.1 3 2 Breyer's view that the Court can
work with Congress echoes some of Dewey's optimism.
2. Cases
In Breyer's second book since coming to the Court, Making Our
Democracy Work, he discusses several controversial Supreme Court cas-
es where there were risks that the President or the public would resist
taking. 3 3 He suggests the Court needs to be restrained. He also advocates
proportionality analysis, or balancing, as how the Court should candidly
weigh state versus individual interests.' 34 He has used this method in two
recent dissents.' 35 The method derives from foreign constitutional
sources, though he doesn't mention that, perhaps for "political" rea-
sons.136
In the famous Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v.
Heller,137 Breyer dissented when the Court ruled that there was an indi-
vidual, not a collective, right to bear arms.' 38 The Court used heightened
scrutiny to strike down a D.C. law restricting firearm possession. 3 9
Breyer, however, said the state's interest outweighed the individual in-
terest given the history of crime, violence, and accidents in D.C. 140
tion. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 130-31 (1996).
131. 2 JOHN DEWEY, Education and Social Change, in THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 408,
416 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987)
132. MENAND, supra note 1, at 4 (describing how Holmes' experiences in the civil war reduced
his optimism about life).
133. See BREYER,supra note 8, at 9-10.
134. Id. at 163-64.
135. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 369 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32-33 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136. Even Justice Scalia has acknowledged that his originalism must have room for stare
decisis for "pragmatic" reasons. SCALIA, supra note 127, at 140.
137. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
138. Id. at 595, 681.
139. Id. at 571.
140. See id. at 634.
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More recently, the Supreme Court struck down a California law
banning the sale of extremely violent video games to minors.141 Breyer's
dissent acknowledged that the law should receive strict scrutiny because
it was content discriminatory. But his strict scrutiny still involved balanc-
ing:
I would evaluate the degree to which the statute injures speech-
related interests, the nature of the potentially-justifying "compelling
interests," the degree to which the statute furthers that interest, the
nature and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and, in light of this
evaluation, whether, overall, "the statute works speech related harm
... out of proportion to the benefits that the statute seeks to pro-
vide."l 42
He found that adults could still purchase the games, and kids could
still play them. Moreover, the law facilitated the ability of parents to
raise their children in the manner they see fit. The law also reduced the
likelihood that children would see these horrific videos. Both cases show
Breyer upholding the democratic process and supporting active liberty.
The complication, however, is that Breyer's judgments are not al-
ways pro-democracy. For example, he voted to strike down a popular
Minnesota tuition voucher plan that sought to remedy inferior schools.143
Breyer also voted to strike down a law banning partial birth abortions,
despite overwhelming public support.'" A few years later, the Court
upheld a revised version of the ban.145 In addition, his balancing test al-
lows judicial subjectivity to creep into the analysis. Nonetheless, he
would respond that certain laws must be struck down as violating the
Constitution.146
E. Economic Pragmatism
The U.S. constitutional revolution sought to remedy the economic
problems caused by the Articles of Confederation. Historian Charles
Beard even argued that the framers were motivated by financial inter-
ests.14 7 More recently, Judge Richard Posner has argued that the Supreme
Court should use economic based pragmatism in constitutional interpre-
141. Brown v. Entrn't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
142. Id. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Play-
boy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
143. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002).
144. Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
145. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
146. For example, Breyer argued in Zelman that the law overwhelmingly benefitted sectarian
religious schools and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. He found the majority's willing-
ness to dismiss this concern as formalism. Thus, his opinion can certainly be viewed as having a
pragmatic, realistic quality consistent with his writings. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 727-28.
147. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 75-76 (1912).
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tation.148 Economics may be the dismal science, but it also can be a revo-
lutionary one. It should be made clear, however, that Beard and Posner
had very different views on normative economics. 149 Indeed, Posner's
ideas have evolved over time, as will be shown.5 o Posner is certainly
aware, however, of their iconoclastic qualities. 15 1
1. Revolution
Historian Charles Beard argued that the U.S. Constitution was not
about the high ideals of democracy or the rights of man:
The makers of the federal Constitution represented the solid, con-
servative, commercial and financial interests of the country-not the
interests which denounced and proscribed judges in Rhode Island,
New Jersey and North Carolina, and stoned their houses in New
York. The conservative interests, made desperate by the imbecilities
of the Confederation and harried by state legislatures, roused them-
selves from their lethargy, drew together in a mighty effort to estab-
lish a government that would be strong enough to pay the national
debt, regulate interstate and foreign commerce, provide for national
defense, prevent fluctuations in the currency created by paper emis-
sions, and control the propensities of legislative majorities to attack
private rights.
... The radicals, however, like Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Sam-
uel Adams, were conspicuous by their absence from the convention.
... [The Convention was convened] to frame a government that
would meet the practical issues that had arisen under the Articles of
Confederation. 152
Beard's view dominated American scholarship up to the 1950s.
Eventually, other historians argued that the relatively wealthy fram-
ers still had divided interests.'53 More recently, American popular histo-
148. RICHARD POSNER, supra note 3, at 76-79. Another scholar calls Posner a democratic
pragmatist, not an economic pragmatist. See llya Somin, Richard Posner's Democratic Pragmatism,
8-9 (George Mason Law and Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 04-09, 2004), available at
www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/ papers/docs/04-09.pdf. Somin's description seems less appropriate given
Breyer's greater emphasis on democracy. Somin's differing label shows the slippery nature of Pos-
ner's pragmatism.
149. For an interesting comparison of Beard with Posner, see Jonathan R. Macey, Competing
Economic Views ofthe Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50, 72 (1987).
150. See Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contempo-
rary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565, 595 (2007) (labeling Posner's pragmatism as
economic and as focusing on a kind of reasonableness assessment).
151. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 47-49 (pragmatism rejects formalism and artifice, and
insists on candor and critique).




rians have portrayed the framers as men of great wisdom, not as grand
property owners. But Beard's views of economically pragmatic framers
remain influential.
2. Cases
Judge Richard Posner is the most famous legal pragmatist. He ar-
gues that the traditional constitutional interpretive tools, such as framer's
intent, text, precedent, etc. rarely answer the toughest legal questions.
Moreover, these tools are subject to the personal vagaries of individual
judges, such as politics, ambitions, institutional concerns, and the like.
Posner therefore advocates economic pragmatism as a descriptively
accurate and normatively desirable approach. 15 4 He seeks to arrive at the
best possible consequences in a case, and economic analysis is a valuable
tool along the way. For example, he writes:
The significance of economics for the study of judicial behavior lies
mainly in the consilience of economics with pragmatism. The econ-
omist, like the pragmatist, is interested in ferreting out practical con-
sequences rather than engaging in a logical or semantic analysis of
legal doctrines. 155
Posner also distinguishes sensible pragmatists from other kinds.L6
Part of what Posner means by economic analysis is cost-benefit as-
sessment. Here's an example of how he treats the Court's major 1973
abortion decision:
There may be no objective method of valuing the competing inter-
ests. But analysis can be made more manageable by pragmatically
153. See FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 93 (1958). Professor Akhil Reed Amar is a more recent opponent of Beard. AICHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 472-73 (2005).
154. POSNER, supra note 3, at 78.
155. POSNER, supra note 6, at 238 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, Justice Scalia dissented in
the Supreme Court's recent California prison overcrowding structural injunction case, which af-
firmed an order releasing prisoners after many years. He suggests that the facts and empirical infor-
mation provided by the plaintiffs was a mere cover for the judge's policy preferences. Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954-55 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But the idea that the three District
Judges in this case relied solely on the credibility of the testifying expert witnesses is fanciful. Of
course they were relying largely on their own beliefs about penology and recidivism. And of course
different district judges, of different policy views, would have 'found' that rehabilitation would not
work and that releasing prisoners would increase the crime rate. I am not saying that the District
Judges rendered their factual findings in bad faith. I am saying that it is impossible for judges to
make 'factual findings' without inserting their own policy judgments, when the factual findings are
policy judgments. What occurred here is no more judicial factfinding in the ordinary sense than
would be the factual findings that deficit spending will not lower the unemployment rate, or that the
continued occupation of Iraq will decrease the risk of terrorism. Yet, because they have been brand-
ed "factual findings" entitled to deferential review, the policy preferences of three District Judges
now govern the operation of California's penal system.")
156. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 239. For another important book on the topic, see MICHAEL
SULLIVAN, LEGAL PRAGMATISM: COMMUNITY, RIGHTS, AND DEMOCRACY (John J. Stuhr ed., 2007).
Sullivan's pragmatism is far different from that of Posner. Id. at 48-49.
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recasting the question as not which of the competing interests is more
valuable but what are the consequences for each interest of deciding
the case one way rather than the other. If one outcome involves a
much smaller sacrifice of one of the competing interests, then unless
the two are of very different value that outcome will probably have
the better overall consequences. That was the approach the Supreme
Court took in Roe v. Wade, in balancing the mother's interest against
the state's interest in fetal life, though the approach was executed in-
eptly. 157
He responds to moralist critics by arguing that alternatives do no
better, yet contain a false rhetoric of certitude."' Candor matters.
Judge Posner also argues that hard cases are fundamentally about
public policy. This is a revolutionary statement for a judge to make.15 9 It
resembles attitudinal theories about the Court held by many political
scientists. Yet Posner argues that difficult cases still "[p]erhaps can be
answered with a fair degree of objectivity by judges armed with basic
economic skills and insights." 60
Posner says there are constraints. Pragmatist judges should general-
ly use narrow reasoning. 16 1 He also has "external" and "internal" limits.
For example, judges are part of a "labor market" where they must com-
ply with internal rules, vocabulary, and reasoning like everyone else.
They cannot toss a coin to make decisions. Legalism is part of pragma-
tism.
Posner says his pragmatism would have helped resolve Clinton v.
Jones.162 The Court refused to grant President Clinton immunity, or a
stay, regarding the Paula Jones sexual harassment lawsuit.163 The Court
relied on the principle that no one is above the law in a democracy.'
But the Court's view that such a lawsuit would not distract from the
President's ability to carry out his duties was nafve. Judge Posner writes
that "a Court consisting of politically savvy Justices would have decided
the case the other way-and that, I am content to argue, would not have
been "wrong" either." 65 The Clinton case ended up leading to the sala-
cious Starr report, and a wasteful politically motivated impeachment
157. POSNER, supra note 6, at 242-43.
158. See id. at 252-55.
159. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review ofRichard A. Posner, How Judges Think, 108 MICH. L.
REv. 859, 860-65 (2008) (expressing concern over Posner's statements of how judges are really
another form of policy maker). But see David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791,
1794-95 (2009) (arguing that Posner says nothing radically new in the book about judging). Interest-
ingly, both Sutton and Levi were federal judges at the time they authored their book reviews.
160. POSNER, supra note 6, at 77.
161. See id. at 246-47.
162. See id at 250.
163. 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997).
164. See id. at 707.
165. POSNER, supra note 6, at 250.
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proceeding. Posner, however, supported the Bush v. Gore ruling as pre-
venting possible chaos.166
Interestingly, Judge Posner has critiqued two other pragmatic
books. He has argued that Breyer's Active Liberty relies on Athenian
process-based constitutionalism. Yet Posner rejects the idealization of
process and says our institutions are rooted in the British common law
tradition as modified by republicanism. 167 Posner also critiques Breyer's
balancing "fuzziness."'l 68
Moreover, he critiques David Beatty's book, The Ultimate Rule of
Law, despite Beatty saying proportionality "makes pragmatism the best it
can possibly be." 6 9 Posner says that Beatty only focuses on the conse-
quences for the people involved, not the institutions.170 Posner concludes
that his own legal pragmatism is disciplined by "a structure of norms and
doctrines, commonly expressed in standards such as negligence, good
faith, and freedom of speech that tells judges what consequences they
can consider and how," unlike that of Beatty."'
Judge Posner's admission that judges make law is useful. Unfortu-
nately, his exalting of economics over other methodologies reveals his
own biases. Some of the flaws in his earlier economic views are revealed
in one of his recent books.17 2 Moreover, recent research casts doubt on
the rational individualistic homo economicus.17 3 In the end, Posner se-
lects the best consequences as key, but judges' values often influence the
assessment.
F. Empirical Pragmatism
Empirical pragmatism involves the use of data or measurement to
resolve constitutional issues. This section could have encompassed Pos-
ner's economic pragmatism, but the empirical focus here is broader. This
section is timely given the trends towards empiricism in American legal
166. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 356. Posner, in this book, uses some powerful language
defending pragmatism:
At least the pragmatic judge will not fool himself that he is the master of an esoteric art
that enables judges to reason their way to the resolution of even the most difficult legal
issues. He will recognize his ordinariness-will recognize that he has no pipeline to truth,
that he is not Apollo's oracle ....
Id. at 351.
167. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 329.
168. See id. at 340. Posner has also vigorously criticized the writings of the former Chief
Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court in support of proportionality. See id. at 362-68.
169. Id. at 355 (quoting DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAw 187 (2004)).
170. Id. at 361-62.
171. Id. at 362. David Luban criticizes Posner as vigorously as Posner questions Beatty. DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 127, 171-73 (1994).
172. ,RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION 1-3 (2009).
173. See DAVID BROOKS, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL: THE HIDDEN SOURCES OF LOVE, CHARACTER,
AND ACHIEVEMENT (2011).
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scholarship. The roots of empirical constitutionalism extend from John
Locke to the use of statistics in modem constitutional litigation.174
1. Revolution
The U.S. Revolution owes much to empiricism and other Enlight-
enment ideas, which prompted the colonists' skepticism about monar-
chy.175 In particular, John Locke, the British philosopher, physician, and
scientist, rejected the Cartesian ideal that people were born with innate
ideas. Locke saw people as born with a tabular rasa, in which the sensory
impressions of experience led to knowledge.176 Locke also advocated the
social contract theory, but not Hobbes's absolutism. 177 Most importantly,
Locke said that revolution could be justified in certain cases.178
The Declaration of Independence borrows from Locke's Second
Treatise on Human Understanding in referencing "the long train of abus-
es. In addition, the Declaration's reference to "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness" echoes Locke's statement that everyone has the
right to defend their "Life, health, Liberty or Possessions." 8 0
Locke's social contract views influenced Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Madison, perhaps the Constitution's primary author. Locke's arguments
in favor of separation of powers, separation of church and state, and the
right to property all found their way into the nation's charter.
2. Cases
The Court has treated empirical evidence inconsistently. The fa-
mous advocate, and later Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis au-
thored the "Brandeis brief," which contained almost no case citations.
Instead the brief referenced statistics showing, for example, how much
174. Several articles address similar themes. See e.g., Coan, supra note 48; Timothy Zick,
Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115
(2003).
175. See MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11-15 (1978).
176. William Uzgalis, John Locke, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (May
5, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/locke/. Modem science, however, has suggested things are
not so simple.
177. See id. at § 3.
178. See id. at § 5.
179. See ALLEN JAYNE, JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS,
PHILOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY 46-47 (1998) (observing not only the similarity of "train of abuses"
language, but the similarity of "the thrust of his argument"); see also PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 135-137 (1997) (contemplating that the
"long train of abuses" language echoed Locke as well as other thinkers at the time).
180. See, CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (1945) (Jefferson had read Locke several times); see also GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 229-230 (1978) (comparing
Jefferson language with the "Lockean tread"). Wills argued, however, that the Declaration was
rooted strongly in the Scottish Enlightenment, not just in Locke's views. Wills's position, however,
has been vigorously contested. See e.g., Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment:
A Critique of Garry Will's Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. &
MARY Q. 503 (1979).
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women suffered in the early twentieth century workplace.'' One of these
briefs was filed in the 1908 case of Mueller v. Oregon,182 where the
Court upheld the protective legislation for women.183
By contrast, the Court rejected statistical information around the
same time in Lochner v. New York.184 There, it examined a law that lim-
ited baker work hours based on data that showed negative health ef-
fects.'85 The majority found this evidence insufficient to prove that being
a baker was inherently dangerous, like being a coal-miner.'86 The Court
also did not want to open other industries to regulation.'8 7 Holmes, how-
ever, dissented and said that the Court was improperly constitutionalizing
the free market.' 88 The irony was that Holmes was a free marketer. Also
in dissent, Justice Harlan said the data adequately supported the law.'89
In Brown v. Board of Education,190 the Court relied on social sci-
ence to strike down racial segregation. Psychologist Kenneth Clark
showed white-colored dolls and black-colored dolls to black and white
elementary children who attended segregated schools.' 9 ' The white chil-
dren preferred the white dolls.192 Surprisingly, the black children said the
same thing.19' Clark concluded this proved that segregation made black
children feel inferior.194 Separate but equal was not equal.
Unlike the Lochner Court, the Brown Court relied on the scientific
or statistical data presented. The evidence also made the Court's conclu-
sions seem objective. The problem, though, is that social science today
views Kenneth Clark 1950s tests as methodologically inadequate.' 95
Roe v. Wade had empirical elements.'9 6 Justice Blackmun reasoned
that women had a right to abortion before viability because the medical
community used viability as the point when life began.'9 7 He conducted
his research at the Mayo Clinic library and was a former Mayo General
181. Orin Kerr, The Original "Brandeis Brief" THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 4, 2011, 1:38
PM), http://volokh. com/2011/05/04/the-original-brandeis-brief/.
182. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
183. See id. at 423.
184. 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
185. Id at 59.
186. Id.at55.
187. Id at 59-60.
188. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 65-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191. See id. at 484-85.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 495.
195. Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social
Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 61 (1978).
196. 410 U.S. 113, 134-35 (1973).
197. Id. at 162-64.
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Counsel.'98 Scholars have questioned this "scientific" view because they
thought the viability line would shift over time, as doctors got better at
keeping premature babies alive.199 Interestingly, this line has not shifted
much. Pro-life groups, however, are relying on empirical evidence to
purportedly show that a fetus feels pain beyond twenty weeks old.200
While Brown and Roe were liberal majority opinions relying on
empirical data, Craig v. Boren20 1 reached a liberal result but showed
Lochner's data skepticism. The Court struck down a law that allowed
women, but not men, between ages eighteen and twenty-one to drink a
low alcohol beer. The statistics showed that eighteen- to twenty-one-
year-old males were ten times more likely to be arrested for drinking and
driving than their female counterparts. Justice Brennan, however, re-
sponded:
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state offi-
cials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical
technique. But this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological
propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevita-
bly is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the
Equal Protection Clause. 2
02
In McCleskey v. Kemp,20 3 the Court upheld the Georgia death penal-
ty despite a multi-variate regression analysis showing systemic racial
bias.204 The Court said the study did not prove discriminatory intent af-
fected Warren McCleskey's particular sentence.205 Moreover, our legal
system accepts that each jury is different.206 Ironically, the Court later
credited simplistic data, when it declared the death penalty constituted
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to minors207 or the mentally
retarded.20 8 The data involved counting how many states had such laws
in the books.
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
California law that banned violent video games from children. 20 9 Justice
Scalia rejected the adequacy of psychological studies introduced by the
state because they showed no causation between utilizing these video
198. LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME
COURT JOURNEY 27, 90 (2005).
199. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUnONAL LAW 855 (6th ed. 2009).
200. Steven Ertelt, Pro-Lifers Welcome First Fetal Pain Abortion Ban Lawsuit,
LIFENEWS.COM (Sept. 1, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://www.Iifenews.com/2011/09/01/pro-lifers-
welcome-first-fetal-pain-abortion-ban-lawsuit/.
201. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
202. Id. at 204.
203. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
204. Id. at 286-87, 312-13.
205. Id. at 297.
206. Id. at 294.
207. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005).
208. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).




games and violent behavior.2 10 At most, they showed some correlation.
He said such videos are no worse than the gruesome violence in chil-
dren's fairy tales.212 Further, parents can limit child access by using the
video industry rating system.2 13
Justice Breyer responded that.the Court should defer to the legisla-
ture because
[t]here are many scientific studies that support California's views.
Social scientists, for example, have found causal evidence that play-
ing these games results in harm. Longitudinal studies, which measure
change overtime, have found that increased exposure to violent video
games causes an increase in aggression over the same period.
Experimental studies in laboratories have found that subjects ran-
domly assigned to play a violent video game subsequently displayed
more characteristics of aggression than those who played nonviolent
games.
Surveys of 8th and 9th grade students have found a correlation be-
tween playing violent video games and aggression.
Cutting edge neuroscience has shown that "virtual violence in vid-
eo game playing results in those neural patterns that are considered
characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior."
And "meta-analyses," i.e., studies of all the studies, have conclud-
ed that exposure to violent video games "was positively associated
with aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, and aggressive af-
fect" 214
Leading pediatric organizations, including the AMA, endorsed a
joint statement on the dangers of these games. 2 15 Breyer said these stud-
ies explain "in a commonsense way" that video games are more harmful
than films or television because the games involve "acting out" the vio-
lence. 2 16 To summarize, the Court has been inconsistent in its treatment
of empirical data. Yet such data has mattered in some revolutionary cases
like Brown and Roe.
210. Id. at 2739.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2736.
213. See id. at 2740-41.
214. Id. at 2768 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
215. Id. at 2769-70. There is an interesting article discussing the difficulty of studying the
effects of porn or violent entertainment on children. Brian Palmer, Bush v. Gore: Is it Worse for a
Child to See Pornography or Graphic Violence?, SLATE (June 28, 2011, 5:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news andjpolitics/explainer/2011/06/bush v gore.html.
216. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (emphasis omitted). This commonsense reference resem-




Some argue that constitutional adjudication resembles the common
law. The judges examine cases one by one, look at precedent, and then
consider moving the law forward incrementally based on gradually
changing community values. The common law does not favor courts
announcing grand principles or using deductive reasoning. Recently,
David Strauss advocated common law constitutionalism in The Living
Constitution.217
1. Revolution
There are many views regarding the ideological origins of the
American Revolution. John Locke is at the center, but it's harder after
that. Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
offered five possibilities: classical antiquity, Enlightenment rationalism,
the British common law, New England puritanism, and republicanism
(sometimes called radical Whiggism). 2 18 Bailyn's inclusion of the com-
mon law is interesting because that was the underlying legal framework
in Britain, which the American Revolution revolted against. Garry Wills
would likely add the Scottish Enlightenment.219
James Stoner2 20 and Michael McConnell 221 support a common law
view of the revolution.222 The colonists fought the revolution to redeem
their natural rights as British citizens.2 23 Stoner and McConnell rely for
historical support on writings by Coke and Blackstone.224
Supporters of this view assert that the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution drew on these traditions. They criticize Bailyn for
overemphasizing republicanism. Stoner also critiques the Locke empha-
sis:
The influence of Locke on the doctrine of natural rights and revolu-
tion is unimpeachable, and Locke's theory, however much it echoed
and then influenced English practice, begins as a theory of abstract
right. But at least as much as Locke ever intended, into that theory
217. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 2-3 (2010).
218. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23-
35 (1967).
219. See WILLS, supra note 180, at xiii-xiv.
220. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 8-9 (1992).
221. Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1998).
222. See generally Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Just Not Who We Are: A Critique of Common Law
Constitutionalism, 54 VILL. L. REV. 181, 184-91 (2009); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitu-
tionalism and the Limits ofReason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007).
223. McConnell, supra note 221, at 196.
224. STONER, supra note 220, at 11-68, 162-75; McConnell, supra note 221, passim.
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were integrated doctrines and practices of English common lawyers
and their notion of an ancient constitution .... 225
Stoner likewise argues that Paine's Common Sense and Dickinson's
Letters to a Farmer have common law roots. 22 6 Stoner's views, however,
are contested.227
2. Cases
David Strauss relies on some of Justice Holmes's reasoning about
the common law,2 28 but Strauss has a more progressive bent. Strauss also
invokes Edmund Burke to argue that constitutional precedents are valua-
ble intellectual capital. 22 9 He then says of the common law:
The.., attitude is an inclination to ask "what has worked in prac-
tice?" It is a distrust of abstractions when those abstractions call for
casting aside arrangements that have been satisfactory in practice,
even if the arrangements cannot be fully justified in abstract terms.
The world is a complicated place; no body of theory can fully ac-
count for it. If a practice or an institution has survived and seems to
work well, those are good reasons to preserve it; that practice proba-
bly embodies a kind of rough common sense, based in experience,
that cannot be captured in theoretical abstractions.230
Strauss shows how the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of cer-
tain types of affirmative action relied on support from moderately con-
servative businesses and the military, both of which found such policies
useful in a globally competitive environment. 231
Strauss then discusses the California Supreme Court decisions nulli-
fying the privity in contract requirement. 23 2 There was a complex interac-
tion between a changing society, popular sentiments, expectations about
the roles of corporations, etc. Similarly, in the constitutional arena, the
Court's views about free speech, and racial segregation, evolved over
time. Strauss says Brown was a kind of "common law overruling" of
225. STONER, supra note 220, at 189.
226. See id. at 190.
227. See, e.g., Barry Alan Shain, An Unconvincing Defense, FIRST PRINCIPLES (June 2, 2008),
http:/www. firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=79 (critiquing Stoner's overreliance on
common law). But see 2 EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with
the Colonies (March 22, 1775), in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 100-
03 (John C. Nimmo ed., 1887) (supporting the common-law view).
228. See generally OLVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW AND THE COMMON
LAW (Kaplan Publ'g 2009)
(1897) (laying out Justice Holmes's views on the common law).
229. See STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 41.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 42, 44. The Court's reliance on stare decisis in the abortion decision, Casey, has
a common-law quality.
232. Id. at 81-82.
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Plessy v. Ferguson2 33 based on the NAACP's lengthy litigation cam-
234
paign.
Several critiques are possible. Strauss's evolutionary theory doesn't
describe the Supreme Court's sudden reversals of a nineteenth century
legal tender ruling or the Court's 1937 switch in time on the New Deal.
Also, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court outlawed restrictions on gay sex
that had been allowed less than twenty years earlier.235 Even Strauss con-
cedes these cases are like de facto constitutional amendments.2 36 Moreo-
ver, there is something troubling about using private law norms, which
facilitate profit making, to govern public law principles.
H. Flexible Pragmatism
The Supreme Court is frequently deferential in assessing the consti-
tutionality of actions taken by the other government branches, especially
given changing social circumstances. In McCulloch v. Maryland,23 7 the
Court gave a broad definition of the Necessary and Proper Clause 238 that
allowed for a Bank of the United States to serve a new nation.239 Chief
Justice Marshall said this was a constitution being expounded, not a
code. The Court's previously discussed "switch in time" cases allowed
FDR's administrative state to be created. The Court's liberal approach to
delegation doctrine is a further example. Another well-known, flexible
separation-of-powers case was Morrison v. Olson,240 which upheld the
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute, even though the law
created a powerful and unorthodox Executive Branch position.24'
By contrast, the Court was strict in INS v. Chadha24 2 and in Clinton
v. City of New York, 243 which involved the legislative veto and line-item
vetoes, respectively. The Court upheld rigid interpretations of bi-
cameralism and presentment in those cases. 244 During the Korean War,
Justice Jackson authored a very pragmatic opinion in Youngstown Steel
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2 45 which took account of three possible types of
wartime situations.246 Yet he ultimately reasoned that President Truman
lacked the authority to seize domestic steel mills.
233. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
234. See STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 85.
235. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,578 (2003).
236. See STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 116.
237. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
238. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 18.
239. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 324-46.
240. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
241. See id. at 659-62.
242. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
243. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
244. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
245. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
246. See id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). It is possible that rigorous formalism may also
be the most pragmatic approach in some cases.
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Subsequent developments, however, have vindicated the dissents in
some of the above cases. Many scholars now think that Justice Scalia's
formalistic dissent was right in Morrison because of the massive amount
of power and money that independent counsel Ken Starr later wielded
while investigating sexual shenanigans and perjury by President Clin-
247ton. Moreover, despite Chadha, an informal system of legislative ve-
toes remains because it is so useful.248
Overall, this kind of pragmatism is consistent with a revolutionary
impulse because it allows for institutional change to be accepted in cer-
tain cases.
I. Critical Pragmatism
Feminists, 249 Africanists,250 and some other legal scholarS251 have
supported critical pragmatism. It has been contrasted with complacent
pragmatism. 252 The American Revolution certainly required a critical
capability, though not in a post-modem sense.
1. Revolution
In 1987, during bi-centennial celebrations of the U.S. Constitu-
tion,253 Justice Thurgood Marshall gave a famous speech criticizing the
document and the framers.254 He argued that the Constitution (and revo-
lution) was forever tainted by treating slaves as three-fifths of a person
255and therefore as sub-human. He said this showed why the Constitution
had to be seen as a living and evolving document.256 His speech was the
kind of critique that fits with this strand of pragmatism.
247. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 24-27 (1998).
248. See Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
121-22 (1992).
249. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699,
1699 (1990).
250. See Celestine 1. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultur-
al Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 409-10
(2000) (discussing how critical pragmatism can be used to attack gender hierarchies).
251. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner's
and Rorty s Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 97, 147-48
(1996) (detailed discussion of critical pragmatism, as opposed to constructive pragmatism).
252. Irma J. Kroeze, Doing Things with Values II: The Case of Ubuntu, 13 STELLENBOSCH L.
REv. 252, 262-63 (2002).
253. The U.S. Constitution is frequently treated as sacred as are its drafters. See, e.g., Ozan
Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-1912202 (ex-
plaining that there is a cult of personality in the United States built around the framers and the Con-
stitution, and that Turkey, among other nations, has a similar situation).
254. Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at The Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and







The basic premise of critical pragmatism is that constitutional law
appears to use objective legal criteria, such as precedents, but that the
courts are actually protecting powerful groups. Critical pragmatists want
the Court to shed this pretense and use the law to achieve justice, espe-
cially for the subjugated and vulnerable groups that need protection.
These scholars reject legal formalism and do not see law as easily sepa-
rable from politics. They also focus on the factual context of cases and
seek to undermine hierarchical paradigms. The Supreme Court has only
used an approach like this a few times.
For example, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,25 7 the Court up-
held a minimum wage law for women. 25 8 This overturned Lochner by
rejecting freedom of contract. The Court instead recognized there was a
huge imbalance of power between employee and employer, especially
259given the Great Depression. Moreover, the law assured that women
received a living wage, rather than the community having to subsidize
unconscionable employers by providing welfare later.
The 1950s and 1960s Warren Court issued numerous decisions that
favored the vulnerable. The most famous was Brown. When Chief Jus-
tice Burger took over, this trend continued, to some extent, as the Court
issued Goldberg v. Kelly.2 60 Goldberg repudiated older notions of proper-
ty and ruled that welfare benefits were a constitutional entitlement in the
right circumstances.2 6 1 And in Romer v. Evans,262 the Court said laws
against discrimination should be presumed part of the status quo, in a
case that involved gay people.263
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has been far more trans-
formative. This makes sense as its constitution was designed to reverse
the legacy of apartheid.2 64 Thus, that Court has outlawed the death penal-
ty, vindicated socio-economic rights, authorized gay marriage, and took
many other measures to bring about substantive equality.26 5 Certainly,
critical pragmatism is consistent with the goal of bringing about a demo-
cratic revolution. Moreover, it shows that constitutional pragmatism is
connected to moral principles.
257. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
258. Id. at 398-400.
259. Id. at 400 ("The bare cost of living must be met.").
260. 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
261. Id. at 270.
262. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
263. Id. at 623.
264. S. AFR. CONST., Preamble 1996.




Dan Farber's notion of constitutional pragmatism "essentially
means solving legal problems using every tool that comes to hand, in-
cluding precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy." 6 6 Farber is
holistic:
Pragmatism provides no reason to exclude consideration of original
intent, precedent, philosophy, social science, or anything else that
might be appropriate and helpful in resolving a hard case. Ideally, all
of these factors point to the same outcome. When they conflict, the
only recourse is to make the best decision possible under the circum-
stances. Although this methodology, if it can even be called one, may
seem quite open-ended, pragmatists argue that in concrete cases it is
often possible to identify the most reasonable resolution to such con-
flicts. Decisions are channeled by the professional training and expe-
rienced judgment of the judge, which do not provide unlimited lee-
way and may in fact be felt as coercing a single "right answer."267
Moreover, Farber argues that any foundational method has signifi-
cant gaps.268
Farber's arguments, however, still raise the question of what guides
a judge in utilizing these different tools other than personal prefer-
ences? 269 Farber says that judges should "decide cases, try to construct
theories, and determine what level of generality works best. The pragma-
266. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1332
(1988) [hereinafter Farber, Legal Pragmatism]. Farber coauthored a book that critiqued the most
prevalent foundational constitutional theories and seemingly endorsed pragmatism, subject to further
development. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, at x (2002). Their sequel, however, did not
develop a robust pragmatic approach, but instead relied more on the constraints that exist by virtue
of legal convention, as well as the importance of judicial character. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-7 (2009). Ste-
phen Griffin is not a pragmatist but shares the pluralistic impulse behind Farber's approach. Stephen
Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1753, 1758-62 (1994); see also,
Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT.
L. REV. 673 (1985).
267. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
268. Id.
269. Richard Fallon has published one of the most famous articles discussing how the Supreme
Court should choose between differing interpretive modalities in particular cases. He says there is no
algorithm, but he does develop an order of priority starting with the text as the most important. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1243-46 (1987). Fallon rejects pragmatism, and is no living constitutionalist a
la Thurgood Marshall or Ronald Dworkin. He has another fascinating article on a similar theme.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999). Fallon
helped develop the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction
or implementation. More recently, William Van Alstyne has criticized living constitutionalism by
highlighting its numerous variants. See William Van Alstyne, Clashing Visions of a "Living" Con-
stitution: Of Opportunists and Obligationists, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 13, 18 (2011). But see,
Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1999)
(disagreeing with Fallon's rejection of pragmatism and endorsing a contextual pragmatism for con-
stitutional interpretation).
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tist would like as much system as possible but is agnostic about how
much this will really turn out to be."2 70 The judge should focus on con-
text and consequences. Pragmatism can also rely on moral principles in
the right cases. 2 7 1 He adds that it's easier to demonstrate pragmatism than
explain it.272
Interestingly, Farber's pragmatism is based on his view of tradition.
Thus, Roe v. Wade was correct because it reflected a social consensus
and tradition against the fetal interest trumping the woman's, especially
if the woman's life or health is at stake.273 He also says that pragmatism
would candidly wrestle with the key issue of the status of fetus, presum-
ably unlike Justice Blackmun's opinion.2 74 He asserts that abortion re-
strictions are largely unenforceable in practice, except against the poor or
minorities who can't travel.275 And he expresses concern over the Court's
institutional legitimacy, if it were to reverse itself on abortion. What is
fascinating is how closely the Supreme Court's decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey followed Farber's logic, in discussing the absence
of changed circumstances and in showing concern over the Court's repu-
S276tation.
Farber also discussed why Lochner was unworkable:
Given [the] background of pervasive and accepted governmental in-
tervention, the idea of a natural right to be free from all governmental
interference is simply foreign to our culture. We can hardly imagine
what our lives-or property ownership, for that matter-would be
like without this pervasive aspect of our society. To say that we were
born with economic liberty but are now enslaved by government reg-
ulation seems as eccentric as saying that "fish were born to fly but
everywhere they swim."277
Farber's article is a bit dated. For example, it makes no mention of
the usefulness of foreign constitutional law, which Farber (and Breyer)
has discussed recently. But the article boldly challenges the Supreme
Court's formalism. In that way, it is revolutionary.
K. Prudential Pragmatism
Phil Bobbitt famously described six modalities of constitutional in-
terpretation including prudentialism. 2 78 This paper will use the term to
focus on the Court's cautious tendencies. Edmund Burke could be con-
270. Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 266, at 1349.
271. Id. at 1343.
272. Id. at 1377.
273. Id. at 1372.
274. Id. at 1370-72.
275. Id. at 1375.
276. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
277. Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 266, at 1359.
278. Phillip Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8, 93 (1982).
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sidered the philosophical parent. The leading proponent of such an ap-
proach, former Yale Law School Dean Alexander Bickel, was a Burke
enthusiast and judicial conservative, though a political liberal.
Bickel argued that the courts were the "least dangerous branch" be-
cause of the "passive virtues." 27 9 These include the Court's use of the
political question doctrine and justiciability limitations such as standing,
mootness, and ripeness. The major criticism of these doctrines is that the
Court can easily manipulate them. Stare decisis is also cautious as it
means that courts should follow their earlier decisions. This supposedly
ensures stability. Yet in Casey, the Court upheld Roe v. Wade on stare-
decisis grounds, but then jettisoned Roe's trimester framework.2 80
From a comparative perspective, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa has developed a rights jurisprudence with both transformative and
cautious elements. For example, the Court has ruled that the South Afri-
can Constitution's socio-economic rights provisions are judicially en-
forceable, but has often deferred to the legislature to develop remedies in
particular cases.2 81
Certain other approaches to constitutional interpretation are pruden-
tial. James Bradley Thayer argued that the Court could not strike down a
law unless it was clear beyond question that the law was unconstitution-
al.282 Adrian Vermeule has updated this analysis.283
Cass Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court should generally be
minimalist rather than announce broad principles. 284 This promotes de-
mocracy and institutional integrity. He also introduced the idea of "in-
completely theorized agreements," namely that the nine members of the
Court will not frequently agree on broad principles.285 Yet, Sunstein has
been criticized as inconsistent since he supports some of the Court's
broad rights rulings. 286
Prudential pragmatism does not support revolution. Instead, it justi-
fies the status quo. Some of President Obama's left-wing critics have
279. Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 197-98 (1962).
280. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73.
281. KENDE, supra note 65, at 260-71 (2009); Gov't of the Republic of South Africa v.
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 106-08 (S. Afr.) (holding that the government violated
the constitutional right to access adequate housing, and that the legislature must therefore develop
programs to assist the homeless).
282. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893).
283. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006).
284. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, at xi-xiv (1999).
285. Sunstein, supra note 119, 1746-51 (1995).
286. See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). It must be acknowl-
edged, however, that minimalism and incompletely theorized agreements can support a living consti-
tution. They can be used to justify progressive results, but on narrow grounds. Some have argued




even blamed him for following Sunstein's views on constitutional issues
rather than those of more liberal scholars.2 87
L. Efficiency-Oriented Pragmatism
The Supreme Court has also been pragmatic when it examines
whether a possible ruling will create inefficiencies. For example, the
Supreme Court frequently relies on the administrative convenience ra-
tionale to reject rights claims, as in cases like Korematsu v. United
States288 and Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York. 28 9 The Court's
concern with the slippery slope problem, in cases like Washington v.
Davis2 90 and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices,291 is similar. As Justice Brennan said, though, the slippery slope
,,192
concern is akin to saying that there can be "too much justice.
Thus, efficiency oriented pragmatism is another status quo oriented
doctrine with no revolutionary implications.
CONCLUSION
This paper has examined pragmatism through the lens of democratic
constitutional revolutions. It concludes that there are many types of
pragmatism. 293 Some are essential components of revolutions, while a
few are not. The paper also shows how these types of pragmatism are an
influential part of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. This
paper does not argue that the Court should reject the more traditional
modalities in constitutional interpretation, such as precedent and text. It
also does not exclude the relevance of moral considerations. Yet the pa-
per is sympathetic to the claim that pragmatic considerations are and
should frequently be dispositive. This would indeed be revolutionary.
287. See, e.g., Justin Driver, Obama's Law, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 2011, at 10.
288. 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that mass internment of the Japanese was justified by
national security concerns).
289. 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (finding that a ban on vehicle advertising was justified by traffic
concerns).
290. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (ruling that disparate impact suits under the Equal Protection
Clause would expose the government to numerous lawsuits).
291. 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989) (arguing that state liability, absent a duty to protect, would
expose the government to numerous lawsuits).
292. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
293. Most of them share what Karl Llewellyn has called a "situation sensitive" contextual
focus. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268-74 (1960);
see also, Patrick J. Rohan, The Common Law Tradition: Situation Sense, Subjectivism or "Just-
Result" Jurisprudence?, 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 51 (1963) (summarizing the legal realist Llewellyn's
notion of situation sense). Interestingly, most of the pragmatisms discussed in this paper also share
an appreciation for the importance ofjudicial candor and for narrow decisions, where possible.
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